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DOUBLE DERIVATIVE SUITS AND OTHER REMEDIES WITH
REGARD TO DAMAGED SUBSIDIARIES
WILLIAM

H. PAINTERt

The subsidiary, as a means of doing business, seems to have become
increasingly popular with the growth and sophistication of the modern
corporate enterprise. The reasons for this are complex and varied.
Subsidiaries may be useful for tax reasons,' for achieving the advantages
of limited liability, for centralizing control in a relatively small percentage
of stock ownership, for qualifying to do business under the laws of
the various states, for reasons related to financing,2 and doubtless for a
number of other purposes. On the other hand, their existence in a
particular situation may be due merely to simple inertia on the part of
management in the perpetuation of a corporate entity which has been
acquired by or come under the control of some larger organization.
The legal problems presented by doing business through subsidiaries
are probably as diverse as the factors which motivate the use of this
form of business organization. Thus the hope of limited liability may
be frustrated where, under certain conditions, a parent company' may
be held liable for the obligations of its subsidiary, or a parent may have
t Associate Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law.

1. See, e.g., Sharp, Mudtiple Tax Benefits Through Multiple Incorporation: Some
Thoughts on the Law As It Is, and As It Ought To Be, 40 B.U.L. Rxv. 375 (1960).
Numerous articles dealing with the problem are collected in Strecker, Mdtiple Corporations, Corp. Prac. Comm., Aug. 1960, pp. 1, 2, n.3.
2. See Gant, Illusion in Lease Financing, Harv. Bus. Rev., Mar.-Apr. 1959, p. 121.
3. For the sake of simplicity, the remainder of this discussion will refer to any
corporation holding stock in another as a "parent" regardless of whether the extent
of ownership would be enough to constitute the owner corporation a "parent" in the
usually accepted sense of the term. Similarly, the owned corporation will be referred
to as a "subsidiary." A derivative suit by a parent to enforce a cause of action belonging
to a subsidiary will be referred to as a "simple derivative" action. (The term "single
derivative" is an alternative but it has the disadvantage of ambiguously referring also
to the number of possible actions which might be brought as opposed to the nature of
the action.) A derivative suit by a stockholder of a parent to enforce a cause of action
belonging to a subsidiary will be referred to as a "double derivative" action.
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to qualify to do business and pay franchise taxes in a jurisdiction notwithstanding the fact that it has attempted to restrict its activities
there solely to its subsidiary.
One particularly troublesome problem is whether a parent, through
use of the subsidiary device, may effectively insulate one or more phases
of its business from attack by minority stockholders. Suppose, for
example, that a corporation is engaged in the manufacture of steel
products of various types, including steel pipe and tubing, and that,
for various reasons, it desires to create a business environment in which
the management of its pipe and tubing division may operate free of
liability or indirect control from certain stockholders of the steel company, although subject to the direct control of the steel company's management. An obvious and perhaps facile solution to the problem would
be to create a second corporation to which the steel company would
transfer the assets of its pipe and tubing division in exchange for all
the outstanding stock of the transferee, which would then become a
wholly-owned subsidiary. Since, in the absence of a so-called "spin-off,"
no stockholder of the parent would be a stockholder of the subsidiary,
it would seem that the management of the latter would be responsible
solely to the parent and hence could not be held liable in an action brought
by one or more of the parent's stockholders, to whom they might have
been liable, at least on a derivative basis, had the reorganization not
taken place.
A fundamental problem which characterizes this entire area of
liability is that of the circumstances under which courts are likely to
ignore the form of a transaction and look to what they consider
to be its substance or net effect. Thus, as far as form is concerned,
stockholders of the parent obviously have no direct interest in a subsidiary since they own no stock in the latter, and arguably they should
accordingly have no rights with respect to it in the event of mismanagement; yet common sense seems to say otherwise in view of the artificiality of the subsidiary device in many instances. A fortiori to the
extent that subsidiaries should themselves be owned and operated by
other subsidiaries, all created by or for the parent organization whose
purposes they ultimately serve, although the problems may become more
complex as the interests of the parent's stockholders appear more remote,
the need for various forms of relief, equitable or otherwise, becomes,
in certain instances, more pressing. As one court4 remarked:
4. Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum & Transp. Co., 174 Misc. 601, 665, 21
N.Y.S.2d 651, 711 (Sup. Ct. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 293 N.Y. 281, 56 N.E.2d 705
(1944), affirming 263 App. Div. 97, 31 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1941).
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As corporate structures develop layers and layers of
separate entities, pyramided in a form which centralizes control
in the hands of a few and insulates the various enterprises from
general liability or from taxation, a court of equity must become especially vigilant to protect the minority stockholder,
whose money is in the control of those at the top but whose
voice receives no attention through the maze.
The modern growth of the corporate form of business has
been accompanied by ingenious and artificial legal devices designed to divorce the stockholder from any semblance of control
over his investment. The more tenuous that vestige of control
becomes, the more keen must be the eyes of equity to safeguard
the investment in the hands of those who have the power to
waste it.
In the following discussion, the various theories upon which liability has been based, and the consequent rights of the parent's stockholders with regard to wrongs to the subsidiary, will be considered and
evaluated for their effectiveness.
I.

THE DOUBLE DERIVATIVE STOCKHOLDERS'

SUIT

Of the few remedies available to the stockholder of the parent for
mismanagement, waste and other wrongs with regard to the subsidiary,
the most significant and effective is the so-called double derivative
stockholders' suit. Since the subsidiary nearly always has a cause of
action against those who have perpetrated the wrong, and since a stockholder of the subsidiary may under certain conditions bring a derivative
suit to enforce the cause of action in favor of the subsidiary, it should
follow that stockholders of the parent, which is of course a stockholder
of the subsidiary, should, at least in some situations, have a right to
enforce the parent's derivative cause of action. Hence the derivative
stockholders' action once removed, as it were, or double derivative suit.
Although the above reasoning may seem convincing on first analysis,
there are a number of uncertainties with regard to the conditions under
which a double derivative action should be permitted. For example,
although the argument for permitting such an action may be especially
persuasive in the case of a subsidiary which is wholly-owned by a parent
which itself has perpetrated the wrong, what result should follow with
regard to a subsidiary which is not wholly-owned, or one in which the
parent has a relatively small interest? Would a stockholder of an investment company or mutual fund have a right to sue on a double deriva-
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tive basis for mismanagement of the affairs of one of the companies
in which the fund or investment company has invested if those who
manage such investments refuse to bring suit themselves? Should the
double derivative action be restricted to wholly-owned, substantially
owned or at least "'controlled" subsidiaries? Where should the line
be drawn?
Questions such as the above are best resolved by further inquiry
into the theory behind the double derivative suit. Unfortunately, however, there seems to be not one theory but rather a number, several of
which may overlap.
1. The fiduciary theory. Since the derivative cause of action is,
after a manner of speaking, an "asset" of the parent, it like other assets
is held by the parent as a "fiduciary" for its stockholders. If the parent
wrongfully refuses to enforce the cause of action, this is both a waste
of the parent's assets and a breach of its fiduciary duty to its stockholders. Accordingly, the latter should be permitted to enforce the
cause of action on a double derivative basis.
This explanation of the double derivative suit seems unconvincing for
a number of reasons. First of all, the derivative cause of action is hardly
an "asset" of the parent in the usual sense of the term "asset" since its enforcement would not result in any monetary recovery or other direct benefit
to the parent but would benefit it only indirectly by way of a possible increase in the value of its investment in the subsidiary. The distinction
between the cause of action and the stock of the subsidiary held by the
parent is of course crucial here. The stock is an "asset" in a very real
sense, but the cases which adopt the fiduciary theory do not seem to
emphasize that the reason for permitting the double derivative suit is to
prevent diminution of the parent's investment (i.e. stock) in its subsidiary5 but stress rather the parent's refusal to enforce the derivative
cause of action which it holds as a "fiduciary" for its stockholders.'
5. Such diminution might give rise to a simple derivative cause of action in favor
of the parent against those responsible for waste of its assets, rather than a double
derivative suit with regard to the subsidiary. In this connection, see the discussion of
General Rubber Co. v. Benedict, 215 N.Y. 18, 109 N.E. 96 (1915) in Section II, infra.
6. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422, 425 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 737 (1944): "A shareholder's suit in essence is nothing more than a suit by a
beneficiary of a fiduciary to enforce a right running to the fiduciary as such; a double
derivative suit is one in which the beneficiary is in his turn a fiduciary, and as such
refuses to enforce the right which is his as beneficiary of the first fiduciary." Comtpare
Goldstein v. Groesbeck, supra with the reasoning of the lower court opinion in Carter
v. Producers & Refiners Oil Co., 164 Pa. 463, 30 Atl. 391, 394 (1894): "He [the stockholder] o'wns a part of the property of the [subsidiary] . . . or is a cestui qute trust with
reference thereto by reason of the ownership of a part of the property of the [subsidiary]

.

.

.

by the [parent company]. ..

."

Although the parent owns stock in the

subsidiary,' it is obviously inaccurate to refer to it as owning any of the property of the
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Furthermore, aside from the somewhat doubtful analogy between a
corporation and a trust, it does not follow that the beneficiary is
permitted to sue in every instance where the trustee has wrongfully
refused to do so.7 Finally, acceptance of the fiduciary theory would
seem to imply that, wherever a derivative cause of action is held by
the parent in a fiduciary capacity, the stockholders of the parent should
be permitted to enforce the cause of action when the parent has been
guilty of a breach of its fiduciary duty. If this is so, the rule
would extend considerably beyond existing case law to permit recovery on a double derivative basis wherever a parent holds stock in
another company, no matter how negligible its interest may be. Surely
a breach of fiduciary duty, like a breach of moral duty, is not less so
merely because its subject-matter is only "a small one."
2. Disregard of the corporate entity. Another possible rationale
for the double derivative suit is to consider it as based upon disregard
of the separate entities of the parent and subsidiary, treating the two
as a single enterprise of which the plaintiff is a stockholder. The
result is by hypothesis not a double derivative, but merely a simple
derivative action brought on behalf of the combined enterprise. Although there is no compelling reason for doing so, it would seem more
satisfactory from a technical standpoint to apply the same criteria to
these cases as is applied in other situations where it becomes of importance
to determine whether the court should disregard the corporate form,
or "pierce the corporate veil" as the popular expression goes. Thus,
in the absence of evidence that the affairs of the parent and subsidiary
have been conducted as if they were a single enterprise, intermingling
of bank accounts, identity of directors and officers, or, to use a test
proposed in a leading decision by Judge Learned Hand, "the parent's
direct intervention in the transaction, ignoring the subsidiary's paraphernalia of incorporation, directors and officers," 8 the corporate
subsidiary. A fortiori a stockholder of the parent owns no part of the property of either
the subsidiary or the parent.
7. See Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 270 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 962 (1960), holding with regard to an active trust with several beneficiaries
that one beneficiary could not sue derivatively on behalf of the trustee, who had refused
to sue, without the joinder of all beneficiaries as indispensable parties. On this point
there was one dissent and the case was criticized in 73 HARv. L. REv. 1393 (1960).
Generally speaking, however, the weight of authority appears to be that a beneficiary
may sue derivatively if the trustee refuses to do so. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 351 n.58
(rev. ed. 1946) ; 13 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5985 (1943 repl. vol.).
8. Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265, 267 (2d
Cir. 1929). The opinion continues, "The test is therefore rather in the form than in
the substance of the control; in whether it is exercised immediately, or by means of a

board of directors and officers, left to their own initiative and responsibility in respect
of each transaction as it arises. Some such line must obviously be drawn, if shareholding

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
entities should not be disregarded and, consequently, recovery on a
double derivative basis should be denied, if this is to be the sole rationale
of the action.
But the above seems to be too narrow a test, at least if the great
weight of authority in this area is correct, since, with a few minor
exceptions, none of the reported cases emphasize the necessity of using
the criteria normally employed to determine whether the corporate
entity should be disregarded as a means of deciding whether there is
a right to sue on a double derivative basis. A lower New York court
may have by dictum suggested this,' but the remark was highly gratuitous
under the circumstances of the case and is probably erroneous even if
accepted at face value."0 An early federal district court opinion, Sabre
v. United Traction & Electric Co.," suggesting a similar approach,
appears to have been influenced to a considerable extent by the fact that
counsel chose to argue the case on a theory of disregard of the corporate
entity rather than a double derivative theory 2 which may not at that
time have attained full acceptance, at least in the federal courts.' Other
alone does not fuse the corporations in every case. Much of the metaphor in the books
merely impedes discourse, as judge Cardozo well observes in Berkey v. Third Avenue
Ry.; here, as elsewhere, it is ordinarily a symptom of confused thinking." Despite
the usefulness of the criterion suggested by Judge Hand in Kingston Dry Dock Co.
v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., supra, an examination of the cases discloses no one
"test" which may be depended upon, each decision being more relevant to its own peculiar
fact situation than exemplifying a single rule. For a valuable discussion of some of the
early cases, see Douglas & Shanks, Insulation from Liability through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193 (1929). A recent opinion by one of the co-authors of the
article contains some further discussion. NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398,
403-04 (1960). See generally BAKER & CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
394-96 (3d ed. 1958), collecting some of the better known source materials.
9. Schneider v. Greater M. & S. Circuit, Inc., 144 Misc. 534, 541, 259 N.Y. Supp.
319, 328 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
10. See Note, Suits by a Shareholder in a Parent Corporationto Redress Injuries
to the Subsidiary, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1313, 1315 (1951), suggesting that the dictum may
have been inconsistent with prior and subsequent New York decisions. Even assuming
the validity of the test, and applying it to the facts of the case, the court in Schneider
v. Greater M. & S. Circuit, Inc., supra note 9, may have been in error in refusing to
disregard the corporate entities in view of (1) the fact that the parent and subsidiaries
had common officers and directors and (2) an express finding that there was "unity
of ownership, operation, control and management." Schneider v. Greater M. & S.
Circuit, Inc., supra note 9 at 535, 259 N.Y. Supp. at 321.
11. 225 Fed. 601 (D.R.I. 1915).
12. Id. at 603. Compare Sabre v. United Traction & Elec. Co., supra note 11 with
Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926).
13. See DeVan v. United States, 50 F. Supp. 992 (D.N.J. 1943). The DeVan
holding is of doubtful authority in view of the fact that one of the cases relied upon
was subsequently reversed. Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 42 F. Supp. 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1941),
rev'd, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944). In addition, the only
other authority relied upon, aside from Sabre v. United Traction & Elec. Co., supra
note 11, was primarily concerned with a procedural point, the failure to join the parent
corporation as an indispensable party. Busch v. Mary A. Riddle Co., 283 Fed. 443 (D.
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decisions which rely on the concept of disregard of the corporate entity
do so as an alternative ground for the holding rather than an exclusive
test of the right to bring a double derivative action. 4
3. Subsidiary as a "mere agent" or "instrumentality." A few
cases give as a reason for permitting double derivative actions the fact
that, in a particular situation, the subsidiary may be acting merely as
an "agent" or "instrumentality" for the parent in carrying out the
latter's instructions."5 In a sense this is merely a legal conclusion or,
more accurately, a description of one of the classic rationales for disregarding the corporate entity.' 6 As such it scarcely qualifies as a
separate test of the right to bring a double derivative suit and, to the
extent that it states or describes merely a result rather than a reason,
it is not a test at all. In any event, it is subject to the same criticism
as the theory based on disregard of the corporate entity in that it is,
if anything, too narrow and unsatisfactory an explanation of the majority of cases in this area.
4. "Holding" company and "'operating" company. Occasionally a
court states that one situation where a double derivative action is permitted is where the relationship between parent and subsidiary is that
of a "holding" company to an "operating" company.'
There appears
Del. 1922). See Note, Suits by a Shareholder in a Parent Corporationto Redress Injuries
to the Subsidiary, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1313, 1315 (1951).
14. E.g., Hirshhorn v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 54 F. Supp. 588, 592 (W.D.
Pa. 1944).
15. Piccard v. Sperry Corp., 30 F. Supp. 171, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) ("mere conduit
or instrumentality") ; Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum & Transp. Co., 174 Misc.
601, 712, 21 N.Y.S.2d 651, 752 (Sup. Ct. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 293 N.Y. 281,
56 N.E.2d 705 (1944), affirming 263 App. Div. 97, 31 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1941) ("no more
than business conveniences . . . never considered separate and distinct corporations
in the sense that they were independent of [the parent]"). Similar language appears
in many of the cases dealing with the analogous right of a stockholder of a parent to
inspect books and papers of a subsidiary. Martin v. D. B. Martin Co., 10 Del. Ch. 211,
217, 88 Atl. 612, 615 (Ch. 1913); Woodworth v. Old Second Nat'l Bank, 154
Mich. 459, 468, 117 N.W. 893, 896 (1908) ; Bailey v. Boxboard Prod. Co., 314 Pa. 45,
48, 170 At. 127 (1934). The question of right of inspection is considered in detail in
section III, infra.
16. Weisser v. Mursam Shoe Corp., 127 F.2d 344, 346 n.3 (2d Cir. 1942), quoting
a passage from United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 62-63 (1920) as "a classic
statement applied generally in cases piercing the corporate veil." The test is said to be
whether ownership of the subsidiary "is resorted to, not for the purpose of participating
in the affairs of the corporation in which it is held in a manner normal and usual with
stockholders, but for the purpose of making it a mere agent, or instrumentality or
department of another company. . . ." United States v. Reading Co., supra. See
Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUm. L. REv. 343, 348 (1947). Douglas
& Shanks, Insidation from Liability through Subsidiary CorporationS, 39 YALE L.J.
193, 195 (1929).
17. Breswick & Co. v. Harrison-Rye Realty Corp., 280 App. Div. 820, 821, 114
N.Y.S.2d 25, 26 (1952) (memorandum decision). One of the cases relied upon by
the court was Hirshhorn v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 54 F. Supp. 588, 592 (W.D.
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however, to be no one recognized definition of the term "holding company." Since a distinction is drawn between that and an "operating"
company, one would infer that the former is intended to designate a
corporation formed primarily, if not exclusively, for the purpose of
holding stock in one or more subsidiaries and which does not itself
engage in operational activities. It is unclear whether this means that
the "holding" company must own all of the stock of the subsidiary,"
as well as whether it may engage in operational activities of an incidental
nature. In any event, such a rule, if it exists, seems arbitrary and
artificial in character, since there seems to be no real reason for limiting
the right to bring a double derivative suit to holding companies, and the
cases indicate that the right has not been so restricted.
5. Common control. One of the most frequent situations where
double derivative actions have been permitted is where "the original
corporation that is said to have suffered wrong and its shareholder
corporation which had the right to bring a derivative suit were in the
control of those charged with inflicting the corporate injury," to quote
what may have become the classic holding in this area.1" The reasons
Pa. 1944), where the defense argued that double derivative actions should be allowed
only with regard to holding companies. This view was, however, rejected: "While contending that the plaintiff has no right to enforce the action for Catalyst Research,
defendants admit that the rule may be different for holding companies. But . . . it is
the element of control which determines the 'double derivative' right, not whether the
parent company is also an operating company." The court in effect adopted the broader
criterion of "common control" suggested in United States Lines, Inc. v. United States
Lines Co., 96 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1938), discussed infra.
18. Complete ownership does not seem to have been required. Kaufman v. Wolfson,
1 App. Div. 2d 555, 151 N.Y.S.2d 530 (1956). Essentially the same result was reached
in a parallel federal case; Kaufman v. Wolfson, 132 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
See Craftsman Fin. & Mortgage Co. v. Brown, 64 F. Supp. 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (50%
ownership); Hirshhorn v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 54 F. Supp. 588 (W.D. Pa.
1944) (60% ownership) ; Birch v. McColgan, 39 F. Supp. 358 (S.D. Cal. 1941) (49%
ownership) ; cf. Carter v. Producers & Refiners Oil Co., 164 Pa. 463, 30 Atl. 391 (1894)
(68% ownership). In Saltzman v. Birrell, 78 F. Supp. 778, 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), the
court expressly declined to specify a minimum stock ownership required for bringing
a double derivative suit. The point is apparently still left open by the decisions, most
of which have concerned subsidiaries in which the parent had approximately 50% or
more by way of stock ownership. If the "control" test of United States Lines, Inc. v.
United States Lines Co., 96 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1938) is adopted, then control as a
practical matter (i.e. ability to determine the fundamental policies and, at least potentially, to direct the activities of the subsidiary through control of the requisite
majority of its board of directors) would seem to be the determinant rather than mere
percentage ownership.
19. United States Lines, Inc. v. United States Lines Co., supra note 18. Of similar
effect are Kaufman v. Wolfson, 132 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), noted in 25 FORDHAMT
L. REv. 140 (1956), 2 How. L.J. 263 (1956) ; Saltzman v. Birrell, supra note 18; Hirshhorn v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., supra note 18; Kaufman v. Wolfson, 1 App. Div. 2d
555, 151 N.Y.S.2d 530 (1956). In United States Lines, Inc. v. United States Lines Co.,
supra the court permitted a double derivative action despite the fact that a supposedly disinterested committee of stockholders of the parent had recommended not to proceed with
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for permitting such an action are obvious, since it would be naive to
expect those on the board of directors of either corporation to vote in
favor of either a direct or a simple derivative action under such circumstances. "If any other rule were adopted, the plaintiffs would be
denied all relief, and the wrongs of which they complain would go
unredressed."2
Perhaps more troublesome than the above case of so-called "common external control"21 is that presented where the wrongdoer or
defendant controls only one of the corporations, or controls none at
all. If he controls the parent corporation, and the latter controls the
subsidiary, the reasons for permitting a double derivative suit are
essentially the same as where the wrongdoer controls both corporations,
for, by his control of the parent, he can effectively block any action
against himself either by the parent or by its controlled subsidiary.
But if the parent should not be in control of the subsidiary, there is
less reason for permitting a double derivative action, particularly if
there is an opportunity for a disinterested majority of the board of
directors and/or stockholders of the subsidiary to vote on the desirability
of maintaining an action. Similarly, if the wrongdoer should control
the subsidiary but not control the parent, a disinterested vote of the
board of directors and/or stockholders of the latter not to bring a
derivative suit should be enough to prevent a stockholder from suing
on a double derivative basis except in those exceptional instances where
a majority may not ratify or consent to a transaction in such a way
as to bind the minority.22 Essentially the same considerations would
a derivative suit and this recommendation was subsequently approved by a majority of
stockholders, which, due to the defendants' control, was of course an interested majority.
Although declining to say categorically that the defendants' stock could not be voted
in favor of the recommendation, the court said that this should not be permitted unless
there was a clear showing that it was advantageous to the corporation and its stockholders. Compare this aspect of the case with S. Solomont & Sons Trust v. New England
Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass. 99, 93 N.E.2d 241 (1950), holding that a vote of a
disinterested majority of the parent company's stockholders would prevent a double or
triple derivative suit.
20. Ryan v. Leavenworth, A. & N.W. Ry., 21 Kan. 365, 404 (1879). The court
,vent on to observe that, even if the management of the two corporations was willing
to bring the action, it would be a "mockery" to permit it since the suit would be
essentially against themselves.
21. See Note, An Examinuation of the Multiple Derivative Suit and Some Problems
Involved Therein in Light of the Theory of the Single Derivative Suit, 31 N.Y.U.L. REV.
932, 936 (1956).
22. See S. Solomont & Sons Trust v. New England Theatres Operating Corp.,
326 Mass. 99, 93 N.E.2d 241 (1950) and United States Lines, Inc. v. United States
Lines Co., 96 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1938). One of the classic situations in which the vote
of a disinterested majority may not be effective to bind a minority is that of fraud.
Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912). But even in instances of fraud, illegality, or other similar wrongs there is a diversity of opinion
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prevail, a fortiori, where the wrongdoer is a complete stranger, or at
least is not in control of either corporation.2"
The question of whether the parent must own a controlling interest
in the subsidiary in order to permit recovery by a stockholder of the
parent on a double derivative basis, or whether at least a minimum
interest by way of stock ownership should be required, is still an open
one. As stated above, the overwhelming majority of cases permit
recovery in the absence of complete ownership, but, in most of the
instances, if not all of them, the parent has been in control.24
It has been suggested that neither control nor a minimum amount
of stock ownership should be required since there is no such requirement
with regard to the right of the parent corporation to bring a simple
derivative suit." The suggestion may have a theoretical appeal perhaps,
concerning the right of a minority of stockholders to insist on suing against the protest
of a disinterested majority, some courts preferring to follow the strict English view
established by Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 461, 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (Ch. 1843) and thus
prevent the minority from suing derivatively without the majority's consent. See
Claman v. Robertson, 164 Ohio St. 61, 128 N.E. 2d 429 (1955) ; BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 346-47 (rev. ed. 1946). The federal cases, construing the language in FED. R. Civ.
P. 23(b) requiring application to the shareholders "if necessary," have been similarly
split. See BAKER & CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPoRATIONS 654 (3d ed. 1958).
In Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1959), a derivative action
by shareholders of General Motors to recover treble damages for activities of dupont,
a substantial stockholder of General Motors, which previously, in United States v.
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957), had been found to be in violation
of the antitrust laws, the court held that it was not necessary for the plaintiffs to make
a demand on the General Motors stockholders before bringing the derivative suit. One
of the reasons given was "the combination of duPont's sizable ownership of General
Motors stock, the number and diffusion of the remaining stockholders, and the inability
under relevant state law of the shareholders as a body to cause General Motors to
prosecute [the] . . . action. . . ." In addition, the court pointed out, "At best a ratification by the body of shareholders merely compels the minority shareholder plaintiffs
to shift slightly the legal theories on which they rely so as to raise charges of fraud,
waste of corporate assets, or the like. . . . In the instant case even this slight effect
on the litigation cannot occur, since the wrongful acts alleged-violations of the
antitrust laws by duPont-can in no way be ratified or rectified by a vote of the shareholders of General Motors." Id. at 197. For other valuable recent discussion on the
federal level see Marco v. Dulles, 177 F. Supp. 533, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
23. Generally speaking, the plaintiff should give the board of directors of the
parent and of each subsidiary involved an opportunity to exercise its discretion to refuse
to bring the action. Note, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 932, 941-42 (1956) ; Note, 64 H. v. L. REv.
1313, 1318 (1951). In addition, perhaps a similar demand on the stockholders of the
parent company should be required, at least in the federal courts or in a jurisdiction
which continues to follow the doctrine of Foss v. Harbottle, supra note 22. If the
parent company should control the subsidiary a similar demand on the stockholders of
the latter would be superfluous, unless the vote of a majority would be ineffective due
to fraud, illegality, etc. See note 22 supra.
24. See note 18 supra.
25. Note, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1313 (1951), citing United States Lines, Inc. v. United
States Lines Co., 96 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1938) which, since it involved a parent and
subsidiary both under the common control of the defendant, is of little value on the
question of minimum stock ownership.
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and yet it need not necessarily follow that, in every instance where a
parent may bring a simple derivative action, its rights may be enforced
by one of its stockholders on a double derivative basis. In fact, there
may be serious policy reasons for refusing double derivative recovery
where the ownership interest of the parent is minimal, either with
respect to the "control" factor as regards the subsidiary or with respect
to the total assets of the parent itself, as in the case of mutual funds
and other investment companies. To argue that double derivative
recovery should be permitted because "wrongs should be redressed"2
is to beg the issue. There are numerous instances in the law of derivative
stockholders' suits where, for one reason or another, the plaintiff may
not be entitled to sue despite the existence of a "wrong" to the corporation. 7 It is perhaps no coincidence that a case squarely presenting the
question has yet to arise, in view of the likelihood that, where one
company holds an interest in another which is not substantial enough
to be controlling, a bona fide determination of the board of directors
of the former not to sue derivatively would normally preclude recovery
on a double derivative basis. In such a situation, there is certainly not
the same probability of interlocking directorates, identity of officers
and directors and other elements of community of interest between the
two corporations which would, in the case of a controlled subsidiary,
render the board of directors of the parent an interested board of
26. Note, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 932, 941 (1956). The argument recalls some of the
following language of the early opinion in Holmes v. Camp, 180 App. Div. 409, 412, 167
N.Y. Supp. 840, 842 (1917): "The part which a stockholder plays in such an action is
merely that of an instigator. The cause of action is that of the corporation, and the
recovery must run in its favor. Under these circumstances it is not easy to see why
a stockholder in a holding company may not maintain such an action for the benefit of
the subsidiary company, and thus indirectly for the advantage of the holding company.
His stock interest in the latter company is sufficient to relieve him from the imputation
of being a mere officious and impertinent intermeddler. The free use of holding
companies which has grown up in recent years would prevent the righting of many
wrongs if an action like the present might not be maintained by a stockholder of a
holding company." In Holmes v. Camp, supra, however, there was 97 per cent ownership
of the subsidiary by the parent and hence the case does not involve the question of
minimum stock ownership, except, perhaps, with regard to the stockholder plaintiff, and
that does not appear material to the right to sue derivatively. Given a sufficient interest
of the parent in the subsidiary, if a minimum interest should be required in this respect,
there seems to be no reason to require that the stockholder plaintiff hold a similar
minimum interest in the parent's stock.
27. E.g., the inability of the so-called "subsequent shareholder" to sue derivatively
in many jurisdictions and also in the federal courts, where FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)
requires an allegation that the plaintiff "was a shareholder at the time of the transaction
of which he complains or that his share thereafter devolved on him by operation of
law. . .

."

Also so-called "security-for-expenses" statutes in numerous jurisdictions,

which appear to codify a policy against "strike suits" by those with only a minimum
interest in a corporation. -E.g., N.Y. GEN. CoRe. Law § 61-b; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 1322 (Supp. 1960).
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directors and hence not qualified to prevent double derivative recovery
by its refusal to sue.
Nevertheless, in a few relatively rare instances, double derivative
recovery might be allowed despite the absence of "control." Generally
speaking, this would seem appropriate where the management of the
parent, by refusing to sue derivatively, is exceeding the bounds of
ordinary business discretion and is guilty of a breach of trust amounting
to waste of the parent's corporate assets.2" In view of the wide discretion given directors in refusing to enforce corporate causes of action
even where enforcement might result in some direct or indirect corporate benefit, the area in which double derivative actions should be
permitted in the absence of "control" is necessarily limited, and the
mere existence of a derivative cause of action which might be enforced
by the parent is, in itself, obviously insufficient. Thus, for example,
investment companies and mutual funds should not normally be exposed
to litigation of the double derivative variety despite the existence of
simple derivative causes of action with regard to particular investments
in their portfolios.29 On the other hand, where the parent's directors
have been clearly arbitrary or guilty of a breach of trust in refusing
to sue derivatively, a double derivative action should be permitted
even in the absence of "control." Although this may be nothing more
than a variant of the "fiduciary" theory discussed above, unlike the cases
which follow the "fiduciary" theory, the crucial factor here is the
presence of potential corporate waste with regard to the parent's investment in its subsidiary rather than waste of the derivative cause of action,
considered as a corporate "asset." In this regard it may resemble
28. Cf. Notes, 49 HARV. L. REv. 1004 (1936) ; 34 Mica. L. REv. 680, 684 (1936) ;
45 YALE L.J. 649, 666 (1936). As these authorities indicate, the line between a breach
of trust and ordinary business discretion with which the courts will not interfere is not

a clear one. See particularly Notes, 34 MicH. L. REv. 680, 684 (1936) and 45

YALE

L.J.

649, 666 (1936). The question of breach of trust would ordinarily be one of law, but
if certain facts need be established in order that the existence of a breach of trust
be determined, the question could be submitted to the fact finding body under appropriate
instructions that there should in no event be a finding for the plaintiff unless the
parent's directors, in refusing to bring a derivative action, were guilty of a breach
of trust.
29. The worry here may be an illusory one in view of the restrictions, self-imposed
or otherwise, under which such concerns customarily operate, limiting the amount which
may be invested in any one security. See, for example, restrictions set forth on page
8 of the Prospectus, dated October 15, 1960, of Scudder, Stevens & Clark Common
Stock Fund, Inc.: "To insure adequate diversification, no more than 5% of the value
of the Fund's gross assets may be invested in the securities of any one issuer except
the United States Government. The Fund may not purchase the securities of any issuer
if such purchase would cause more than 10% of any class of securities of such issuer
to be held in the portfolio, and may not invest in the securities of companies which, including predecessors, have not a record of at least three years of continuous operation."
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superficially the cases discussed in the following section, which permit
direct recovery by the parent for waste of its investment, and yet the
suggestion here is to permit double derivative, rather than direct recovery,
as is allowed by those cases.
If the above is an acceptable solution to the question of when
double derivative suits should be permitted, there is no reason why it
could not be made applicable to more complex derivative actions involving
triple derivatives with sub-subsidiaries and more elaborate corporate
structures.3" In most instances there will be a sufficient control relationship, either one of common control by the defendant or control of
one corporation by another. In the rare situation where control does
not exist, the test could be made applicable to each link in the chain.
Thus the initial determination is whether there is a derivative cause
of action in favor of the lowest subsidiary, then whether there is a
double derivative cause of action in favor of the subsidiary next highest
in the chain and similarly until the rights of the plaintiff are determined.

II.

SIMPLE DERIVATIVE ACTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARENT

As opposed to the remedy discussed in the foregoing section, which
concerns a cause of action existing in favor of the subsidiary, which the
stockholder of the parent may enforce on a double derivative basis,
there is another theory of recovery involving a cause of action in favor
of the parenzt, enforceable either directly by it or on a simple derivative
basis by one or more of its stockholders. This is suggested by the somewhat controversial case of General Rubber Co. v. Benedict.3 There
a parent corporation which owned all but eighteen shares of a Brazilian
subsidiary sued one of the parent's directors alleging that he, together
with the general manager of the subsidiary, had caused funds to be
wrongfully transferred from the latter to another company in which
the defendant owned a twenty-five per cent interest and of which he
was also, vice-president. The theory of recovery was not derivative,
although it was recognized that there may have been a derivative cause
of action as well, but was rather that the director, by conspiring with
the manager of the subsidiary to deprive it of assets, or by negligently
permitting the manager to do so, had violated his fiduciary duty to
30. There seems to be little question that triple derivative suits are recognized
along with double derivatives. Marcus v. Otis, 168 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1948) ; Kaufman
v. Wolfson, 132 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Saltzman v. Birrell, 78 F. Supp. 778
(S.D.N.Y. 1948); Kaufman v. Wolfson, 1 App. Div. 2d 555, 151 N.Y.S.2d 530 (1956).
31. 215 N.Y. 18,,109 N.E. 96 (1915). The case is discussed at some length in
Notes, 50 HARv. L. Rav. 963 (1937) ; 28 HARv. L. REv. 409 (1915) ; 2 U. CM. L. REv.
317 (1935). See also Comment, 38 YALE L.J. 965, 968 (1929).
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the parent to conserve its assets and to prevent a depreciation in value
of the parent's investment which he might have foreseen and which,
by taking appropriate measures, he could have prevented. With two
justices dissenting, the New York Court of Appeals sustained the
complaint on demurrer, holding, in effect, that the duty of the defendant
to the parent to conserve its assets was distinct from any duty he may
have had to its subsidiary and that it gave rise to a cause of action even
though the subsidiary may also have been entitled to recover for the
same wrong. The Court recognized the possibility of double recovery
but said that this was merely a matter of estimating the damages to
be recovered by the parent." Any subsequent recovery by the subsidiary
would inure to the parent's benefit indirectly and consequently the existence of the subsidiary's cause of action could be taken into account in
assessing the amount by which the parent's investment had depreciated
in value. The extent of reduction in value was held to be a question
for the jury."
How the jury was to make an intelligent appraisal
on such a basis was not indicated, and the court, somewhat casually
it seems, disposed of the problem with the doubtfully reassuring statement that, "Whatever difficulty there is in determining the measure
of the loss is inherent in the very nature of these problems of appraisal.
To determine the value of the shares, every asset of the subsidiary
company must be reckoned, and the defendant's liability to that company,
if it exists, must be included like any other."34 An important part of
the appraisal process then would be a jury determination of the present
value of a hypothetical cause of action in favor of the subsidiary, necessitating an instruction to the jury on the law with respect to that
cause of action in the same manner as would be required if the subsidiary rather than the parent had been the plaintiff. 5 The possibilities
of confusion here are obvious, since the jury is required to consider
two theories of liability which, although technically distinct to a lawyer,
are likely to be one and the same to laymen who have not had the good
32. Id. at 24-26, 109 N.E. at 98-99.
33. Id. at 25, 109 N.E. at 98.
34. Id. at 26, 109 N.E. at 99. The injury to the subsidiary resulted in a decrease
in value of its assets. But, since the subsidiary's cause of action to recover for the
injury is, in a sense, an asset, the damage sustained by the parent (i.e. the decrease in
value of its shares) will obviously depend on the difference in worth of the subsidiary's
cause of action and its lost assets. See Note, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1313, 1317 n.32 (1951).
35. The court by way of dictum stated that the defendant would not be liable to
the subsidiary for "mere neglect" and implied that such liability would have to be based
upon proof of conspiracy with the manager of the subsidiary to plunder it. Id. at 23-24,
109 N.E. at 98. See Note, 2 U. Cns. L. REv. 317, 320 n.18 (1935).
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fortune to become acquainted with the subtleties of the legal mind.3"
Furthermore, the reasons for permitting the plaintiff to recover
directly for damage to its subsidiary are not clear. To argue that the
damage referred to in the complaint is not the damage suffered by the
subsidiary but rather that which has been sustained by the parent in
the depreciation in value of its shares is unconvincing, for by this
hypothesis any stockholder could recover directly for a corporate wrong."
The fact that in the General Rubber case, the defendant was also a
director of the plaintiff, and hence owed it a fiduciary duty, should
not in itself justify direct recovery for a wrong which in reality is one
against the subsidiary. The theory of the complaint evidently was that,
if the defendant had informed the plaintiff of what he knew concerning
the damage being done to the subsidiary, "the plaintiff could and would
have taken such action as would have caused the funds and moneys ...
theretofore so misapplied to have been recovered and as would have
prevented the further misapplication of said funds and moneys." 38
However, as the dissenting opinion pointed out, even if this were so,
the parent company would still be in a position to cause the funds to be
36. In this connection see the recent concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Bok in
Fisher v. Strader, 399 Pa. 222, 225-26, 160 A.2d 203, 204-05 (1960), remarking with
some distress on the "twelve-year-old mentality we ascribe in one breath to the average
juror . . . [while in] another breath we expect of him prodigious feats of memory
and absorption . . . and . . . douse him with a kettleful of law that would make a

third-year law student blanch."
37. The instances in which direct recovery has been allowed are somewhat exceptional in nature and frequently involve situations where there is a so-called "separate
duty" owed by the defendant to the plaintiff (separate from the duty owed to him as a
stockholder), or where the wronged corporation is in the process of liquidation or is no
longer in existence and it would be futile to permit recovery in its favor. For cases
involving the "separate duty" theory, see Note, Remedies of Stockholder of Parent
Corporation for Injuries to Subsidiaries, 50 HARv. L. REv. 963, 964 n.8 (1937). For
discussion of these and other situations in which direct recovery has been permitted
see BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 143 (rev. ed. 1946). Occasionally such recovery has
been permitted where a derivative suit would unjustly enrich or confer some indirect
benefit upon the defendant due to his being a stockholder in the corporation. See, e.g:,
Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955). But
none of the above seem applicable to General Rubber Co. v. Benedict, 215 N.Y. 18, 109
N.E. 96 (1915) except, possibly, the "separate duty" theory. The "separate duty"
involved could only arise from the fact that the defendant happened to be a director of
the plaintiff corporation, since it seems clear that, absent such a relationship, he would
not have been liable to it directly, even if he had been motivated by a malicious intent
to injure it, unless he had intentionally caused the value of its shares to be depressed
with the hope of buying them himself. See BAKER & CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 636-37 (3d ed. 1958) and Note, 28 HARV. L. REV. 409, 410 n.7 (1915). But,
in view of the disadvantages of permitting direct rather than derivative recovery, and
the evident feasibility of the latter, it is highly arguable that the "separate duty" theory
should not be stretched to cover this situation, although this is precisely what the court in
General Rubber Co. v. Benedict, supra seems to have done.
38. General Rubber Co. v. Benedict, supra note 37, at 29, 109 N.E. at 100 (extract
from complaint quoted in dissenting opinion).
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recovered through an action brought by the subsidiary or by bringing
a derivative action itself. 9 If such a suit would have been unsuccessful
because of some defect in the cause of action of the subsidiary, there
would then be no danger of double recovery, and a direct action by the
parent could be allowed,4" but it certainly was not clear in the General
Rubber case that the subsidiary would have been unable to recover,
and it seems unwise to require a jury to prophesy the future in such
a situation.4 In addition, it is of course irrelevant whether the defendant
is solvent or is unable to satisfy a judgment, despite some speculation
The
in this regard by both the majority and dissenting opinions.4
ability of the defendant to pay should not determine the existence of
a cause of action against him. If he were insolvent, there would of
course be little point to the action; if he were solvent, the parent, alleged
in the complaint to be in control of the subsidiary, could either cause
the latter to sue or could bring a derivative suit itself. The crucial point
is that the defendant should not be exposed to the possibility of double
recovery and it is scarcely comforting that, in a direct action by the
parent, the jury may technically be required to assess the worth of a
hypothetical cause of action belonging to the subsidiary. Added to
this is the risk that rights of creditors and shareholders of the subsidiary
may be prejudiced by permitting the parent to recover for the impairment of its interest without direct recovery being permitted all others
similarly affected. To draw a distinction between the latter and the
parent on the ground that, in the General Rubber type situation, the
defendant owes a fiduciary duty directly to the parent and only indirectly to the shareholders of the subsidiary (through his direct obligation to the subsidiary) seems artificial and an undue preference to the
parent merely because one of its directors happened to have caused the
damage. On the other hand to permit each stockholder of the subsidiary
39. Id. at 29-30, 109 N.E. at 100.
40. See Note, 2 U. Cmr. L. REV. 317, 320 n.18 (1935) and note 35 supra. If the
director were found rherely negligent, the subsidiary might have no cause of action
against him and, accordingly, direct recovery by the parent on a theory of "separate
duty" would seem unobjectionable.
41. It is assumed that, absent a "separate duty" relationship, stockholders of the
subsidiary other than the parent would not be permitted to recover directly. See note 37,
supra. Similarly, it is generally agreed that the rights of creditors of the subsidiary
may' be prejudiced in these situations. See Note, 50 HAv. L. REv. 963, 966 (1937),
raising the further possibility of a multiplicity of suits with potentially differing results,
since the determination in the parent's suit of damages to the subsidiary would not be
res judicata in a subsequent action by the subsidiary, nor in any action brought by one of
its stockholders other than the parent.
42. General Rubber Co. v. Benedict, 215 N.Y. 18, 24, 29, 109 N.E. 96, 98, 100 (1915).
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direct recovery involves all the disadvantages of a multiplicity of suits
which it is the function of a derivative action to avoid.
If problems such as the above may be involved in a direct, rather
than derivative, action by the parent, such a theory a fortiori should
not be used to justify a derivative suit on behalf of the parent by one
of its stockholders, as opposed to a double derivative action. However,
if it were established that the subsidiary has no cause of action, direct
recovery by the parent and, theoretically at least, a simple derivative
action by a stockholder of the. parent, might be appropriate. 3 In all
other cases, the parent and its stockholders should be required to bring
the action on behalf of the subsidiary, which would result in a judgment
in its favor, thereby eliminating the risk of double recovery and prejudice to the rights of its creditors and other shareholders.4 4
In summary, then, although direct recovery by the parent, or simple
derivative recovery on behalf of the parent by one of its stockholders,
remains a distinct possibility in jurisdictions which accept the "separate
duty" concept of the General Rubber case,4" the better remedy by far
is the double derivative suit. If the subsidiary has not been harmed,
or if for some reason it has no cause of action, there are by hypothesis
no grounds for double derivative recovery, and consequently a suit by
or on behalf of the parent would be the proper if not the only remedy.

III. INSPECTION OF BOOKS AND RECORDS OF THE SUBSIDIARY
Assuming the existence of a right to bring a double derivative
action under certain conditions, of almost equal importance is the right
of access to the subsidiary's books and records to ferret out wrongdoing
and determine the basis for recovery. Although, if the subsidiary were
a party to the action,4 6 the requisite information could be made available
43.
44.

See notes 35 and 40 supra.
See Notes, 50 HARV. L. REv. 963, 966-67 (1937) ; 28 HARV. L. Rav. 409, 411

(1915) ; 2 U. CMI. L. REv. 317, 319-20 (1935). The latter two discussions suggest an
alternative solution of granting a stay with respect to the direct action by the parent,
or one of its shareholders suing derivatively on its behalf, pending the determination
of the subsidiary's cause of action. The same effect would be achieved by making the
subsidiary a party to the action by or on behalf of the parent. See Note, 28 HARv. L. REv.

409, 411 (1915).
45. Piccard v. Sperry Corp., 30 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) indicates that the
doctrine is still very much alive. There the court suggested that direct recovery might
be available on an alternative basis in addition to a cause of action on a double derivative basis.
46. In any double derivative action, the subsidiary, as well as the parent, would
normally be considered an indispensable party. See Note, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 932, 940-45
(1956), discussing numerous procedural aspects of double derivative suits, including
necessity of demand upon parent and subsidiary, the "contemporaneous ownership" rule,
and security for costs.
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by discovery proceedings, for obvious reasons it may be desirable to
have access to the records in advance of bringing an action or for some
purpose unrelated to a lawsuit, such as to enable a stockholder to vote
7
his stock intelligently or to assist him in preparing a tax return.
Generally speaking, what few decisions there are in this area follow
the pattern established by the cases involving the right to bring a double
derivative action. Thus there are a few holdings based on disregard
of the corporate entity" as well as the concept of the subsidiary as the
mere "agent" or "instrumentality" of the parent.4" Similarly, where
the latter is exclusively a holding company all of whose operational
activities are carried out by one or more subsidiaries, inspection has
been permitted." There is no reason why a similar result should not
be reached in the case of common control by the wrongdoer of both the
parent and subsidiary, since this is one of the classic instances in which
double derivative recovery has been allowed. Accordingly, inspection
of the records of all the affiliated companies should be permitted.
In at least one respect, however, the conditions governing the right
to bring an action for inspection of a subsidiary's books and records
may differ from those which justify a derivative suit. As regards
inspection, the parent company should obviously not be compelled to
produce books and records of a subsidiary unless it is in a sufficient
control relationship to insure compliance with a court order. With
regard to permitting double derivative actions, the need for a criterion
of- "control ' is not so apparent. If the two corporate entities are not
disregarded, the fact that they happen to share the same offices should
not determine the outcome, although this feature of the situation has
occasionally been given some weight by the courts.51 Essentially the
47. See State ex rel. Rogers v. Sherman Oil Co., 31 Del. (1 Harr.) 570, 117
Atl. 122 (1922).
48. Martin v. D.B. Martin Co., 10 Del. Ch. 211, 88 Atl. 612 (Ch. 1913); State
ex rel. United Brick & Tile Co. v. Wright, 339 Mo. 160, 95 S.W.2d 804 (1936) ; Siravo
v. Sirian Lamp Co., 124 N.J.L. 433, 12 A.2d 682 (Ct. Err. & App. 1940). See Lisle v.
Shipp, 96 Cal. App. 264, 273 Pac. 1103 (1929).
49. Martin v. D.B. Martin Co., mtpra note 48; Woodworth v. Old Second Nat'l
Bank, 154 Mich. 459, 117 N.W. 893 (1908); Bailey v. Boxboard Prod. Co., 314 Pa. 45,
170 Atl. 127 (1934). See Lisle v. Shipp, supira note 48. As pointed out in the foregoing,
the two theories of disregard of the corporate entity and of a subsidiary as a mere
"agent" or "instrumentality" of the parent are not distinct from one another and, if
anything, the latter theory is but a frequently used expression or rationalization for the
former. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
50. State ex rel. United Brick & Tile Co. v. Wright, 339 Mo. 160, 95 S.W.2d 804

(1936).

51. See Martin v. D.B. Martin Co., 10 Del. Ch. 211, 88 Atl. 612 (Ch. 1913);
Siravo v. Sirian Lamp Co., 124 N.J.L. 433, 12 A.2d 682 (Ct. Err. & App. 1940) ; Bailey
v. Boxboard Prod. Co., 314 Pa. 45, 170 Atl. 127 (1934). Similarly, the fact that the
books of the subsidiary are kept in a state different from that in which the principal
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problem is one of control rather than propinquity. And here, although
percentage ownership of the equity should be an important factor, it
is not necessarily conclusive on the issue. Thus, in State exr. rel. Rogers
v. Sherman. Oil Co., 2 where X owned 94 per cent of Y, it was held that
X did not have sufficient control over the affairs of its subsidiary to
insure compliance with a decree for inspection. The factual situation
was admittedly somewhat peculiar due to the short period of time
during which X had held Y's stock, the latter having been purchased
only a few months prior to the date on which the petition for inspection
was filed. Since the annual meeting of stockholders to elect directors
of Y had not yet been held, the court found that X had not yet attained
sufficient representation on the board of directors to make its wishes
felt and complied with. 3 The holding may be somewhat unrealistic,
since it seems likely that, as a practical matter, X could have exerted
considerable influence over Y's directors and officers, despite the technical obstacles to a special stockholders' meeting or immediate replacement of individual directors who refused to comply, but this if anything
illustrates how courts are inclined to decide each case on its own facts
rather than impose a flat rule based exclusively upon the extent of the
parent's interest in the subsidiary.
A possible alternative to the approach taken by the cases considered
above, which involve the obligation of a parent company to make books
and records of its subsidiary available for inspection, is based on the
subsidiary's obligation to permit inspection by a stockholder of the
parent. This could be justified in several ways. If the parent company
is obligated under state or federal law to file annual or other periodic
reports with some regulatory authority, or make such reports available
to stockholders, and if these reports are prepared on a consolidated
offices of the parent are located should not be considered sufficient to defeat the
petition. Williams v. Freeport Sulphur Co., 40 S.W.2d 817 (Tex.' Civ. App. 1930).
But see State ex rel. Rogers v. Sherman Oil Co., 31 Del. (1 Harr.) 570, 117 Atl. 122
(1922).
52. Supra note 51.
53. The court also rejected the petitioner's argument that the parent could have
caused a special meeting of stockholders to be held, if necessary to effectuate its control.
Other cases, such as Martin v. D.B. Martin Co., 10 Del. Ch. 211, 88 Atl. 612 (Ch. 1913),
were distinguished on the ground that there the various companies had been considered
as a single enterprise due to identity of management and control and also the fact that
State ex rel. Rogers v. Sherman Oil Co., 31 Del. (1 Harr.) 570, 117 At. 122 (1922)
was an action at law for mandamus whereas the other cases had been decided in equity,
where the court was thought to have broader powers to disregard ". . . mere forms,
in discovering and revealing fraud. . . ." Id. at 580, 117 Ati. at 126. Generally speaking,
a right of inspection will exist in equity, as distinct from a right of mandamus at law,
only to aid one party engaged in litigation in obtaining information from his adversary
and only if his legal remedy is inadequate. See Note, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1313, 1326 (1951).
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basis, it is arguable that a stockholder of the parent should be permitted
to inspect financial records of the consolidated enterprise since the
parent and its affiliates have been treated as one economic unit, to which
the stockholder must be given access in order that he may understand
intelligently any part.54 The most powerful argument, however, is
that if a stockholder may under certain conditions have a right to sue
on a double derivative basis to enforce a subsidiary's cause of action,
he should have a similar right to inspect the subsidiary's books and
records." Although it might be a misnomer to call such a right double
derivative, since, if anything it is no more than a simple derivative
attempt to enforce the parent's right of inspection, it should exist under
essentially the same conditions as those which determine the existence
of the double derivative cause of action." Whether or not, in a particular
situation, the two remedies are used in conjunction with one another, they
should be considered as complementary and available under the same
circumstances.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Of the remedies available to a stockholder of a parent corporation
for injuries to one or more of its subsidiaries, the most effective is the
double derivative suit. Such an action should be permitted whenever
the parent or wrongdoer is in control of the subsidiary or when the
parent's board of directors, by refusing to sue derivatively, would be
committing a breach of trust. Simple derivative suits by a stockholder
of the parent on its behalf for injuries to its subsidiary should be permitted only where the subsidiary has no cause of action which can be
enforced on a derivative basis. In any event, inspection of books and
records of the subsidiary should be permitted a stockholder of the parent
under essentially the same conditions as those which determine his
right to bring a double derivative suit.
54.

This argument may be ineffective in jurisdictions where the right of inspection

is restricted by statute to stockholders of record. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-920
(Supp. 1960); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 21.45 (1937).
55. Notes, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1313, 1326 (1951) and 50 HARv. L. REv. 963, 968
(1937), the only sources which have been found suggesting this theory. No cases have
taken this approach.
56. Ibid.

